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Democracy in Africa! The very ideasounds like a cruel oxymoron. Ter-rible pictures of seemingly endless
civil wars in impoverished countries, of
starving children in squalid refugee camps,
and of the human brutality of ethnic geno-
cide have typically filled the all-too-erratic
American media reports on Africa in recent
years. These pictures represent very real
human suffering and tragedy, but they also
tell unduly exaggerated and only partial sto-
ries that evoke horrifying images of wide-
spread social, economic and political deg-
radation of an otherwise complex and di-
verse region of the African continent. These
images distort our perceptions and reinforce
unspoken stereotypes of the 560 million
people living in 48 countries. Beyond these
horrifying images, however, and largely un-
noticed by the American media, a dramatic
political transformation has been underway
in sub-Saharan Africa since 1989, and in
some countries, even before that. The cen-
tral feature of this transformation is the yet
unfinished process of democratic transition.
The Historical Context of
Democratic Transitions in Africa
The unfolding process of democratic
transition in Africa is part of what Harvard
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has
termed the "third wave" of democratization
in the modem world. In the first wave be-
tween 1828-1926, modem democracy ex-
panded from its intellectual roots in the
American and the French Revolutions to
Western Europe and parts of Latin America,
before being reversed by the rise of fascism
in Italy and Germany. The second wave be-
tween 1942-62 witnessed the advent of de-
mocracy in Germany, Italy and Japan, in
most of Latin America, and in the Asian and
African countries gaining independence
from European colonial rule. The years
1962-1973 witnessed a reversal of the sec-
ond wave as authoritarian governments re-
placed most of the fledgling democracies in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The third
wave began on April 25, 1974, with the over-
throw of Portugal's 48-year old authoritar-
ian government in a peaceful military coup
and the installation a year later of one of
the world's most successful democracies.
From this ironic beginning, the third wave
spread rapidly to Spain and Greece, across
the Atlantic to Latin America, and then to
Asia. In 1989, as communism and the Ber-
lin Wall fell, it engulfed Eastern Europe, Rus-
sia and most of the former Soviet Repub-
lics, and simultaneously swept across Africa.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
third wave fostered a supportive interna-
tional environment for the incipient but un-
even movements toward democracy in Af-
rica. Democracy has always been an inte-
gral, albeit a problematic, component ofAf-
rican political development for over three
decades. Most African countries gained in-
dependence in the 1960s with democratic
governments elected in the waning days of
European colonial rule. While most ofthem
subsequently turned toward authoritarian
rule, Botswana and Mauritius remained, and
continue to remain, uninterrupted democ-
racies. Gambia's 27 year-old democracy was
overthrown by a military coup in 1994, but
the country elected a new democratic gov-
ernment a year later. In the 1970s, Burkina
Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone and Sudan elected short-lived
democratic governments. More controver-
sially, apartheid South Africa and Northern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) held regular
competitive elections, but with franchise re-
stricted to the minority European popula-
tion. Even in some single-party regimes,
notably in Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi,
Senegal, and Zambia, tightly-controlled can-
didate nominations and electoral competi-
tion among aspiring local candidates served
as important mechanisms for pork-barrel
servicing of local communities with valu-
able national resources, for recruiting new
leaders with strong local ties, and for legiti-
mizing authoritarian governments.
The 1980s witnessed intermittent but
discernible movements toward democracy
on the continent. In Zimbabwe (1980) and
Namibia (1989), negotiated settlements to
protracted civil wars facilitated the estab-
lishment of democratic governments
through multiparty elections. In 1983,
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Senegal elected its first government through
multiparty elections after 20 years of single-
party rule. At the time, it had one ofAfrica's
most stable authoritarian regimes and also
one of the continent's most successful
economies. Its tum toward democracy was
symptomatic of the growing pressure on Af-
rican authoritarian rulers for political and
economic liberalization. The source of this
pressure was the severe economic crises
caused by the combination of a global re-
cession in the early 1980s and misguided
domestic policies of market controls, trade
restrictions, deficit spending, and inflated
currencies. African authoritarian rulers re-
sponded to these pressures with a combi-
nation of political concessions aimed at as-
suaging the most politically important seg-
ments of the society and political repression
aimed at controlling the pace and extent of
liberalization. Thus, the Nigerian military
rulers aborted their self-proclaimed plans for
democratic transition by imprisoning the
business tycoon who had defeated their
hand-picked candidate in the freest and the
fairest elections ever held in the country.
In Ghana, on the other hand, the military
government, forced to implement harsh
structural adjustment policies as a condi-
tion for receiving Western financial aid,
promised and eventually held non-partisan
local elections in 1988 that presaged a suc-
cessful transition to full democracy four
years later. Elsewhere, for example in Kenya,
Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia, authoritarian
incumbents used co-optation, exile and im-
prisonment to silence the weak and frag-
mented pro-democracy forces until con-
certed international and domestic pressures




As in Latin America and Eastern Eu-
rope, democratic transitions in Africa did
not always produce the desired democratic
outcomes, due to a combination of politi-
cally astute authoritarian rulers and politi-
cally inept pro-democracy forces. Even so,
the impact of the third wave on the conti-
nent was, by all measures, dramatic. First,
it unleashed a wave of mass, often violent,
protests (86 in 1991 alone) that directly pre-
cipitated political liberalization in 28 coun-
tries and indirectly launched preemptive
political liberalization in 10 others. In most
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governmental powers and responsibilities
are crafted. African political actors, influ-
enced by strong international norms, have
generally agreed on the basic provisions of
constitutional guarantees of civil liberties
and political rights. However,
they have differed sharply on
the rules of electoral competi-
tion and restraints on govern-
mental power, because these
rules determine opportunities
for political representation, for
shaping public policies, and for
affecting the resulting distribu-
tion of burdens and benefits in
society. It is, therefore, useful
to think of liberalization and
democratization as separate
processes, even though they
are interrelated in practice.
Liberalization is neces-
sary for democratization, but
may not automatically lead to
it. It can produce political
So\j~~~ chaos, as, for example, in
,.. Rwanda and Zaire. It can en-
gender a prolonged period of
uncertainty, especially when
authoritarian rulers (usually
the military) feel threatened by
the pace and extent of political
liberalization and block further
reform, as, for example, in Ni-
geria and Togo. It can produce
fragile democracies susceptible
to military coups, as, for ex-
ample, in Niger. It can lead to
flawed democratization in
which authoritarian incumbents with suf-
ficient political leverage against fragmented
pro-democracy forces successfully manipu-
late democratic elections in their favor, as,
for example, in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire,
Gabon, and Kenya.
Most importantly, thinking about lib-
eralization and democratization as separate
processes helps us to recognize the com-
plexity of democratic transitions and the un-
certainty of transition outcomes. Demo-
cratic transitions are complex processes
because they require the simultaneous de-
struction ofan existing authoritarian regime
and the construction of a new democratic
order. Democratic transitions are success-
ful to the extent that these two contradic-
tory imperatives are adequately managed,
even if not entirely resolved. Democratic
transitions outcomes are always uncertain
Ocean
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large numbers of candidates will enter the
untested waters of electoral competition.
This conclusion is validated by the fact that
an average of 5 candidates ran for the top
office in the 29 founding elections.
The Politics of Democratic
Transitions in Mrica
These quantitative indicators of the
wide scope ofAfrica's third wave democratic
transitions challenge conventional wisdom
about the economic and cultural pre-con-
ditions for the origin of modern democra-
cies. They point instead to a political logic.
An understanding of this logic requires clari-
fying the meaning of democratic transition.
A democratic transition consists of two
closely related processes: (1) a process of
liberalization in which constitutional guar-
antees of civil liberties and political rights
and limits on the exercise of power by the
government and the people replace personal
and arbitrary rule as the basic institutional
framework of governance; and (2) a process
of democratization in which rules regulat-
ing electoral competition and specifying
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thoritarian regimes with the introduction
of explicit constitutional guarantees of fun-
damental civil liberties and political rights.
Second, these initial political openings
sparked an unprecedented efflorescence of
civic associations, private media
outlets (mostly print and radio),
unfettered political debate, and
vigorous criticisms of govern-
ments. Third, and more signifi-
cantly, political liberalization led
to competitive legislative elec-
tions in all 38 countries, with op-
position parties winning seats in
national legislatures for the first
time since independence in 35.
In addition, 29 countries held
"founding elections" in which r v.",.
the chief executive was directly
elected by the people in a com-
petitive election. Finally, these
founding elections produced
peaceful leadership turnover for
the first time since indepen-
dence, as 13 former authoritar-
ian incumbents who ran for elec-
tion were defeated, while 15 were
re-elected. In a novel political
development for Africa, former
authoritarian rulers who were
defeated in the founding elec-
tions were returned to office in
the second round of democratic
elections in Benin and Madagas-
car.
Measures of levels of politi-
cal participation and electoral
competition in founding elec-
tions also confirm the dramatic nature of
Mrica's third wave democratic transitions.
Measuring the level of political participation
by voter turnout as percentage of registered
voters indicates an overall average turnout
of 64 percent across the 29 countries hold-
ing founding elections. This figure is not
high by global standards, but is impressive
nevertheless, especially ifwe recall that most
of these countries were governed for over
two decades by authoritarian regimes which
either proscribed or tightly controlled po-
litical participation. Measuring electoral
competition by the winner's share of votes
as a percentage of total votes cast indicates
an average winner's share of 63 percent for
the 29 countries holding founding elections.
This equally impressive figure indicates that,
after an extended period of authoritarian
rule with limited political opportunities,
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because the construction of a new demo-
cratic order requires crafting new rules of
governance whose potential costs and ben-
efits reside obscurely in the future. Since
authoritarian incumbents and pro-democ-
racy elites who craft democracies can only
anticipate without fully knowing these fu-
ture costs and benefits, they will prefer rules
that will favor their particular interests in
the new democratic order. With their cur-
rent power relations defining their conflict-
ing interests, they struggle to design the
rules of the new democratic order. This
struggle animates the politics of democratic
transitions. All new democracies, whether
in the first, second or third wave, thus
emerge as improvised, negotiated and of-
ten unintended second-best solutions to
this quintessential political struggle.
The nature of this struggle and the
types of democracies emerging from it in
Mrica today is best illustrated by examining
the politics surrounding the choice of elec-
toral systems. The choice of an electoral
system-the sets of rules that regulate com-
petitive elections and determine their out-
comes-is one of the most important po-
litical decisions made in emerging democ-
racies, because competitive elections are the
principal-but not the only-institutional
means for securing political representation
and access to valued state resources in all
modern democracies. Particularly critical
in new democracies is the choice ofan elec-
toral formula for translating votes into seats.
Plurality (or majority) formulas, tradition-
ally used in Britain and the United States
(and France), require political parties to win
a relative (or absolute) majority of votes in
order to win legislative seats, and usually
discriminate against smaller parties. Pro-
portional representation (PR) formulas,
widely used in Western Europe, allocate leg-
islative seats in proportion to the votes won
by political parties, and usually favor smaller
parties.
The two formulas embody different vi-
sions of democratic politics that define dif-
ferent types of democracy. Plurality formu-
las embody a majoritarian vision of demo-
cratic politics that clearly defines the locus
of political authority and accountability,
whereby incumbent and opposition parties
present voters with clear policy choices, vot-
ers elect the party closest to their policy pref-
erences, and the winning party governs un-
til the next election. PR formulas embody
a consensus vision of democratic politics
Table 1. The Political Dynamics of Bectoral Systems
Choice in Africa's Third Wave Democratic Transitions
Balance 01 Plurality Proportional
Polilical Power (Majorily) RepresenlationElectoral Systems Electoral Systems
Favorable to Cameroon
Authoritarian Central Africa Rep.
Incumbents Comoros
(or to Small Congo




























that contains a more inclusive definition of
democratic governance, whereby a variety
of parties present socially diverse voters a
wide range of policy choices, parties and
voters are proportionally represented, and
a coalition government is formed by bar-
gaining among winning parties, virtually all
or most ofwhich are represented at one time
or another in shifting governing coalitions.
In Mrica's third wave democratic tran-
sitions, the choice of electoral systems with
corresponding visions of democratic poli-
tics reflects the outcome of three distinct
political dynamics, each distinguished by
the relative balance of political power be-
tween authoritarian incumbents and the
pro-democracy forces (see Table 1). First,
plurality (or majority) electoral systems were
generally chosen in those countries in
which the balance of political power favored
the authoritarian incumbents. They were
also chosen in a small number of countries
in which the authoritarian rulers departed
before the onset of democratization, and the
politics animating the choice of electoral
systems was dominated by a small number
of large pro-democracy groups either with
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a national support base (e.g. Mali) or a re-
gionally-concentrated support base (e.g.
Malawi). In all these countries, the relative
power balance enabled the favored groups
to virtually dictate the choice of new elec-
toral systems, with their known support
base and local dominance offering protec-
tion against opposition in competitive elec-
tions.
Second, PR electoral systems were cho-
sen in countries in which the balance of po-
litical power favored the pro-democracy
forces, because of the following political
logic. In all these countries, pro-democracy
forces were multiparty coalitions with the
potential of splitting during and after the
elections. On the one hand, therefore, op-
position leaders wished to reinforce future
electoral opportunities for themselves as a
block vis-a-vis the authoritarian incum-
bents. On the other, they wished to protect
future opportunities for their individual par-
ties that provisionally comprised the present
coalition against the authoritarian incum-
bents. The choice of PR systems was a stra-
tegically rational response to these twin po-
liticallogics.
Finally, PR electoral systems were cho-
sen in deeply-divided countries which ex-
perienced recent civil wars or near-civil war
conditions (e.g. South Mrica). In all these
countries, protracted violent conflicts even-
tually produced what political scientist and
negotiation expert I. William Zartman has
characterized as a situation of "mutually
hurting stalemate." This is a situation be-
yond which further conflict is recognized
by all combatants to be mutually destruc-
tive. In the ensuing negotiated settlements
to these conflicts, the choice of PR electoral
systems offered the most strategically ratio-
nal option to protect the future political in-
terests of all parties in the new democratic
order.
The South Mrican solution, of course,
attracted the most press coverage in the
United States, but that coverage failed to
report that the fatally flawed apartheid sys-
tem and its debilitating legacies prevented
both Nelson Mandela and De Klerk initially
from accepting and articulating a consen-
sus vision of democratic politics. Neither
leader, as a result, preferred a PR electoral
system as his first choice. The PR system
that guided South Mrica's historic demo-
cratic transition was adopted after two years
ofvigorous national debate and intense po-
litical negotiations. In the other six coun-
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tries listed in Table 1 under this pattern of
electoral systems choice, there never was
any discussion of plurality (or majority) sys-
tems, even though Liberia and Sierra Leone
had employed plurality systems in their
failed experiments with democracy in the
1970s, and Zimbabwe eventually returned
to a plurality system in 1985. In negotiat-
ing democratic transitions as settlements
to protracted conflicts, the choice of PR sys-
tems represents a critical confidence-build-
ing strategy aimed at encouraging violent
political enemies to become peaceful politi-
cal adversaries. That such systems are cho-
sen in countries which have no previous ex-
perience with them suggest, more broadly,
that democracies are neither historically de-
termined nor culturally prescribed, but are
crafted by strategically rational actors tem-
pered by political calculations in changing
contexts.
The Prospects for Sustaining
Democracy in Africa
What are the prospects for sustaining
Africa's third wave democracies? Definitive
answers would be premature, since not
enough time has elapsed to accumulate sys-
tematic data on the performance of these
democracies. Several possibilities suggest
themselves, however. First, the prospects
for sustaining new democracies in Africa are
likely to increase with the ability of new
democratic institutions to manage political
conflicts peacefully. Political conflicts are
the inevitable concomitants of routine de-
cisions about the allocation of scarce soci-
etal resources, and the distinguishing hall-
mark of all democracies is the provision of
institutional opportunities for their orga-
nized expression and peaceful management
(contra authoritarian regimes, which deal
with political conflicts by attempting to
eliminate them altogether). Particularly
important are provisions for power-sharing
among major political groups. Such provi-
sions were instrumental in the success of
South Africa's democratic transition, among
others; their absence or ambiguous lan-
guage contributed to the failure of demo-
cratic transition in Angola and the brutal
tragedy in Rwanda. In the absence of for-
mal provisions, informal power-sharing
strategies can also be pursued. For example,
in Guinea, Malawi, and Senegal, among oth-
ers, political parties winning the transitional
elections have invited the leaders of major
losing parties to join national coalition gov-
ernments as a means of legitimizing the
new democratic order.
Second, and related to the first, the new
democratic institutions must provide for ad-
equate opportunities for both present and
'future political representation. A crucial
weakness of African authoritarian regimes
was their arbitrary exclusion and inclusion
of targeted groups from political power,
which increased unpredictability, aggra-
vated fears of permanent exclusion (or
worse), and destroyed any prospects of se-
curing 10ng-terl11 allegiance to the regimes.
To the extent that democratic sustainability
requires a long-term horizon, political ac-
tors require incentives to play by the rules,
especially when they lose. One key source
of this incentive is the recognition that
today's loser will have the opportunity to
become tomorrow's winners. The institu-
tional design of electoral systems is espe-
cially important in this respect. Thus, PR
formulas have fostered political inclusive-
ness in such deeply-divided societies as
Benin, Namibia, and Sierra Leone. How-
ever, plurality systems have also produced
similar outcomes when voters (usually from
the same ethnic group) are regionally con-
centrated and vote as a block, as, for ex-
ample, in Malawi.
Third, improved prospects for demo-
cratic sustainability require institutional
flexibility. Once crafted, institutions (sets
of rules) tend to stick, promoting peace and
stability. But they are unlikely to do so ef-
fectively if they foster socially undesirable
outcomes. Institutional reform is then best
achieved when rules are new and political
actors are just beginning to learn their costs
and benefits. As the experience of several
East European third wave democracies
show, reform of newly-introduced electoral
systems is particularly instrumental in sta-
bilizing otherwise fragile democracies. The
survival ofAfrica's fragile third wave democ-
racies will also depend on their ability to
address this dilemma. Countries such as
Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali have already
successfully reformed their new electoral
systems via an inclusive process of political
negotiations involving government, oppo-
sition, and key civil society actors. Similar
debates are underway in Kenya, where the
present plurality system heavily favors the
incumbent, and in Namibia and South M-
rica, where the present PR systems, despite
their initial success, give too much power
to political party leaders over the rank-and-
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file members in selecting political candi-
dates.
Fourth, widely accepted rules, even
when they have undesirable consequences,
promote political stability, and political sta-
bility is an essential condition for economic
development. Even as they have challenged
the conventional wisdom that economic
growth is necessary for democratic transi-
tion, the experiences of third wave democ-
racies in Latin America and Southern and
Eastern Europe suggest that economic
growth is necessary for the survival of new
democracies after they are born and that po-
litical stability grounded in widely-accepted
rules of the game is a strong foundation for
economic growth. Perhaps more crucially,
even when such growth has occurred
through harsh and unpopular structural ad-
justment policies that have lowered living
standards, the recognized fairness of demo-
cratic rules have substituted as much-need
"political capital" for the survival of demo-
cratic governments in otherwise fledgling
third wave democracies. Whether Africa's
fledgling third wave democracies have de-
veloped such political capital, or are likely
to do so in the future, is unclear. But, as
the well-known West African proverb says:
"No condition is permanent!" ~
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